

## Message Text

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NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O.11652 XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, MASS, EAID, JO US XF

SUBJECT: SECRETARY VISIT-AGENDA

1. THE VIEW FROM AMMAN HAS EVOLVED MARKEDLY OVER THE LAST FEW WEEKS AND EVEN DAY. IN SOME RESPECTS IT IS SIGNIFICANTLY (AND EVEN PROFOUNDLY) DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IT WAS WHEN YOU WERE LAST HERE IN MARCH OR DURING THE KING'S VISIT IN MAY. FOR THIS REASON WE THOUGHT THIS LAST MINUTE AGENDA-CHECKLISTS OF ITEMS MIGHT HELP TO FOCUS PRE VISIT FINAL PREPARATIONS.

2. INTERIM AGREEMENT- IN SPITE OF EGYPTIAN EXPLANATIONS AS WE HAVE REPORTEDLY REVIOUSLY, THE ATMOSPHERE IS DEEPLY DISTRUSTFUL OVER THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. KING OFFERED VERY LITTLE TO ME IN THE WAY OF COMMENT ON YOUR MESSAGE THIS EVENING. HE DID HOWEVER SAY A LITTLE ABOVE HIS HOPE THAT THE US REALLY DO SOMETHING ABOUT A FOLLOW ON STEP. BASICALLY THE KING SEEMS TO AGREE WITH SYRIANS ON INTERIM AGREEMENT AND ITS EFFECT ON FOLLOWING POINTS: (A) PRICE FOR AGREEMENT BEING PAY BY EGYPT AND US IS TOO HIGH (B) EGYPT IS EFFECTIVELY NEUTRALIZED AS A FORCE WHICH MIGHT HELP BRING PRESSURE FOR FURTHER AGREEMENTS; (C) ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT TO AND PROBABLY WILL NOT MOVE ON GOLAN (D) THE US HAS USED UP ALL OF ITS LEVERAGE ON ISRAEL IN CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS-WHAT IS THERE LEFT WHICH CAN BRING ISRAEL TO NEGOTIATE ON GOLAN? (E) THE CONGRESS

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IS STILL BROADLY UNDER INFLUENCE OF ISRAELI LOBBY WHICH CAN BE

USED TO KEEP ADMINISTRATION FROM MOVING FURTHER ON GOLAN: (F) THERE MAY EVEN BE A TACIT US-ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO TRADE A HANDS OFF POSITION BY THE US IN DOING ANYTHING REALLY EFFECTIVE ON GOLAN IN RETURN FOR A SIMILAR HANDS OFF ISRAELI POSITION ON THE COMING ELECTION IN THE US. THE ATMOSPHERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLY POINED IN JORDAN ON THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THE ANSWERS TO THE ABOVE AND SIMILAR QUESTIONS (AND SSUMPTIONS) WILL BE A MAJOR PART OF THE JORDANIAN INTEREST IN THE MEETING SET FOR SEPTEMBER 3RD.

3. US-JORDANIAN RELATIONS- THESE ARE INTERLINKED WITH SOME OF THE CONCERNS OVER THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THE JORDANIANS WANT AND HOPE WE WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY AN EFFECTIVE ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS. THEY APPEAR TO BELIEVE THAT THE PRICE PAID FOR THIS AGREEMENT WILL RESULT IN A SLOWING OR STOPPING OF MOMENTUM TOWARD PEACE. FURTHER THEY HAVE A SERIOUS AND PRACTICAL CONCERN ABOUT THE CONTINUING VALUE OF OUR COMMITMENTS TO THEM. THE KING ASKS HOW CAN I CONTINUE TO TRUST US COMMITMENTS NOW THAT THE CONGRESS, OFTEN UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE ISRAELI LOBBY, CAN UNDO THESE COMMITMENTS. THIS AN ISSUE STIMULATED BY THE HAWK SALE PROBLEM: BUT IT GOES MUCH DEEPER THAN THE HAWK SALE. IF THE HAWK SALE GOES THROUGH IT MAY HELP TO ALLEVIATE SOME OF THE MORE ACUTE ASPECTS OF THE CONCERN BUT THE BASIC CONCERN WILL CONTINUE.

4. SYRIA-JORDAN RAPPROCHMENT- KING SEEMSTO BE TREATING THIS QUESTION VERY EMOTIONALLY. SYRIANS HAVE DONE A GOOD JOB SELLING THIER SERIOUSNESS ON THIS ISSUE AND JORDANIANS ARE IMPRESSED. WHILE WE SHOULD HAVE NO HESITATION IN SEEKIG KING'S ASSESMENT ABOUT WHERE HE BELIEVES HE IS HEADED WITH SYRIANS, IT WOULD BE MISTAKE IN MY JUDGEMENT TO RENDER TOO MUCH UNFAVORABLE ADVICE EXCEPT AS SYRIAN RELATIONSHIP MAY OBVIOUSLY IMPACT UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE WHICH NOW EXISTS AMONG THE LEADERSHIP (KING AND RIFAI) TOWARD THE OPENING TO SYRIA.

5. SPECIFIC US-JORDANIAN BREAD AND BUTTER BILATERIAL ISSUES:

A. HAWK SALE- THE JORDANIANS STILL VERY MUCH WANT THE SALE TO GO THROUGH, AND FOR ALL OF THEIR TALK WOULD STILL THINK AGAIN BEFORE TAKING THE SOVIET OPTION. NEVERTHELESS KING HAS PAINTED HIMSELF

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FIRMLY INTO THIS CORNER AND WOULD BE MISTAKE TO THINK HE WOULD NOT FOLLOW THROUGH WITH HIS STATEMENT TO GO TO SOVIETS IF LEFT WITH NO OTHER REAL CHOICE. THEY WILL WANT TO KNOW AS MUCH AS WE CAN TELL THEM ABOUT THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS AND TIMING OF DEALING WITH THIS IN CONGRESS THIS MONTH. NEEDLESS TO SAY THEY FEEL ISSUE WILL BE KEY ONE IN DETERMINING THE COURSE OF OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIP IN THE SENSE THAT FAILURE OF THE SALE WOULD SOUR OUR TIES FOR A LONG TIME TO COME? HOWEVER SUCCESS WILL NOT

REMOVE ALL OF THE SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE FUTURE CHARACTER OF OUR COMMITMENTS AS OUTLINED ABOVE.

B. PL-480 WHEAT- THIS ISSUE IS BEGINNING TO CAUSE SERIOUS CONCERN. AS RECOMMENDED EARLIER WE OUGHT TO BE IN A POSITION TO GIVE THEM A POSITIVE COMMITMENT ON DELIVERY OF 40,000 TONS BEFORE THE END OF THE CALENDAR YEAR AND ALSO ON A FAVORABLE LOOK AT AN ADDITIONAL 40,00 TONS BEFORE JUNE 1976, WE BELIEVE THE FAILURE OF THEIR WHEAT HARVEST JUSTIFIES THIS.

C. BUDGET SUPPORT- THEY ASKED SOME MONTHS AGO FOR ONE QUARTER OF THEIR ANNUAL PAYMENT BEFORE THE END OF SEPTEMBER. WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO TELL THEM THAT WE WILL PROVIDE THE \$13.5 M BY THAT TIME AND A SIMILAR AMOUNT FOR THE NEXT QUARTER-HOPEFULLY BEFORE THE END OF DECEMBER 1975.

D. VIETNAM EQUIPMENT- KING FEELS PERSONALLY LET DOWN AND VIEWS EACH OF THESE INSTANCES AS POSSIBLE EVIDENCE OF A SHIFT IN OUR RELATIONSHIP, BY WHAT SEEMED TO HIM TO HAVE BEEN AN OFFER ON THE PART OF THE SECRETARY TO LOOK FAVORABLY ON HELPING THEM WITH SOME SUCH EQUIPMENT MADE DURING HIS MAY 1975, TRIP. THIS QUESTION HAS NEVER BEEN REALLY FOLLOWED UP. SOMETHING POSITIVE REQUIRED POSSIBLY BY TELLING HIM WE WILL TRY TO DO SOMETHING ON MORE AIRCRAFT WHICH HE WANTS SUCH AS F-5 AND C-130.

3. PRICES ON C-130'S-INDEPENDENT OF VIETNAM EQUIPMENT PENTAGON PROMOSSED TO FIND KING TWO OLDER MODELS. HE IS SHOCKED THAT PRICES BEING ASKED FOR THESE OLDER MODELS COME CLOSE (\$5 PLUS MILLION EACH) TOPRICES FOR NEW AIRPLANES (ABOUT \$7M EACH) SOME EFFORT TO REVIEW THIS POINT WITH PENTAGON REQUIRED.

F. ADDITIONAL MILITARY AID FOR JORDAN. PRIME MINISTER HAS SAID THAT HE UNDERSTANDS THAT ISRAEL (AND EGYPT) WILL BE  
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GETTING MUCH ADDITIONAL AID AND THAT HE DOES NOT INTEND TO BE FAR BEHIND IN HIS REQUESTS TO US. HIS REQUESTS WILL IN PART ALSO BE JUSTIFIED BY HIM ON FACT THAT LAST YEAR WE REQUESTED \$130M FROM CONGRESS FOR MILITARY AID BUT WE ONLY ABLE TO PROVIDE \$100M. WHILE OPEN MINDED ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUEST WOULD HELP WITH JORDANIANS WE HOPE ALSO ADVERSE REACTION IN CONGRESS TO AN INCREASE WILL BE KEPT IN MIND ESPECIALLY IN CONNECTION WITH HAWK SALE.

6. WE RECOMMEND SOME FAVORABLE ATTITUDE ON OUR PART TOWARD THESE BREAD AND BUTTER ISSUES ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT WE STILL VALUE OUR CONTINUING GOOD RELATIONS WITH JORDAN. HOWEVER IF THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND OUR CONTINUING ROLE BECOMES A LIABILITY (WHICH AT THIS POINT WE DO NOT EXPECT WILL HAPPEN) THEN OUR RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE MORE TEMPERED. WE BELIEVE THAT POSITIVE ACTION WILL HELP TO OFFSET SOME OF THE GROWING DISSENT

HEREAND SHOULD FORM AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE VISIT.

7. KING'S OWN MOOD IS MORE FRANKLY SKEPTICAL, AND AS HE PUT IT  
LAST WEEK MORE DEPRESSED, THAN I HAVE SEEN IT BEFORE. WHILE HE AND  
ZAID REALLY NEED LITTLE ENCOURAGEMENT I HAVE ASKED THEM TO  
SPEAK COMPLETELY FRANKLY WITH YOU ABOUT THEIR CONCERNS AND I  
WILL BE MOST SURPRISED IF THEY DO NOT DO SO.  
PICKERING.

NOTE BY OC/T: UPGRADED TO NODIS PER AMBASSADOR 9/2/75

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